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Abstract
An auditor has the responsibility for the prevention, detection and reporting 
of fraud, other illegal acts and errors is one of the most controversial issues in audit-
ing, and has been one of the most frequently debated areas amongst auditors, politi-
cians, media, regulators and the public (Gay et al 1997). Prior research has docu-
mented a positive association between audit quality and auditor size. While some 
studies have used audit fee as a surrogate for audit quality, other studies have em-
ployed more direct measures, such as the outcomes of quality control reviews. Those 
latter studies, however, used samples that suffer from severe geographic or client-
type restrictions. Moreover, most studies of the quality-size relationship have fo-
cused on relatively large CPA firms. In recent years there has been considerable 
debate about the nature of audit practice (Salehi, 2007). Auditors also have respon-
sibility regarding accuracy and precise of statements prepared by managers.
pared by them were ‘true and correct’. And
his function was to give assurance against
fraud and intentional mismanagement.
Gradually, this hearing function of the audi-
tor was transformed into verifying function.
Hence the principal purpose of independent
auditing now is to form an opinion on the
accuracy, reliability and fairness of repre-
sentations in the financial statements of en-
terprises, and to make this information avail-
INTRODUCTION
Etymologically, the word ‘audit is de-
rived from the Latin word, ‘audile’, which 
means ‘to hear’.  Thus in the beginning, the 
word ‘audit’ was meant ‘to hear’ and audi-
tor literally meant a “hearer”. The hearing 
function by the auditor was then aimed at 
declaring that the accounts kept by the man-
agement and the financial statements pre-
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able to external users. Today’s search of
synonyms revealed various suggestions for
the term audit, as follows:. inquiry inquest. exploration examination. inquisition inspection. research scrutiny. study analysis. probe account for. review survey. report on check out
Accordingly, the main object of audit
also transformed thus making the auditor de-
clare that the accounts prepared by the com-
panies as revealed by their financial state-
ments were “true and fair”.
Littleton (1933, p. 260) was the view
that early auditing was designed to verify
the honesty of persons charged with fiscal,
rather than managerial responsibilities.
He identified two types of early audits;
firstly, public hearings of the results of
government official and secondly, the
scrutiny of the charge-and-discharge ac-
counts. “Both types of audit were de-
signed to afford a check upon ‘account-
ability’ and nothing more. It was in ef-
fect a case of examining and testing an
account of stewardship”, (Littleton:
1933, p. 264).  Many researches con-
ducted on the concept of audit and its
purposes too evidence the same.
In the nineteenth century, the role of
auditors has been directly linked to
management’s stewardship function
(Flint, 1971) with stewardship being re-
garded in the narrow sense of honesty and
integrity. But the verifying function was
on sampling basis because of the burgeon-
ing volume of business activity. This func-
tional shift in auditing from ‘true and correct
view’ to ‘true and fair view’ caused a para-
digm shift in the audit process. This also
caused a change in audit opinion from ‘com-
plete assurance’ to 'reasonable assurance.
According to Chow (1982), controlling
the conflict of interests among firm manag-
ers, shareholders and bondholders is a ma-
jor reason for engaging auditors.
In essence, auditing is an independent
function by means of an ordered and
structured series of steps, critically ex-
amining the assertions made by an indi-
vidual or organization about economic
activities in which they has engaged and
communicate the results in the form of a
report to the users.
The audit profession is crucial to cur-
rent economies because of the assurances
that auditors provide to users of finan-
cial statements (Arens and Leobbecke,
2000). Auditing increases the reliability
of financial information provided to in-
vestors, owners, creditors and other us-
ers. In nut shell, the auditor’s duty is de-
tection fraud and errors.
Fraud: the Concept and Definition
Allyne aned Howard (2005:285), de-
fine fraud as “intentional deception, cheat-
ing and stealing”. Some common types of
fraud include creating fictitious creditors,
“ghosts” on the payroll, falsifying cash sales,
undeclared stock, making unauthorized
“write-offs”, and claiming excessive or
never-incurred expenses. Pollick (2006)
regards fraud as a “deliberate misrepresen-
tation, which causes one to suffer damages,
usually monetary losses”. According to
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Pollick, most people consider lying as fraud,
but, in a legal sense, lying is only one small
element of actual fraud. Albrecht et al (1995
cited in Allyne & Howard, 2005: 287) clas-
sified fraud into “employee embezzlement,
management fraud, investment scams, ven-
dor fraud, customer fraud, and miscella-
neous fraud”. Fraud also involves compli-
cated financial transactions conducted by
white financial reporting process and audit-
ing functions. Fraud is the intentional dis-
tortion of financial statements or other
records by persons internal or external to
the authority carried out to conceal the mis-
appropriation of assets or otherwise for gain.
It is a generic term to describe a variety of
offences under either the Theft Act 1968 or
the Criminal Justice Act 1987. This defini-
tion does not include other irregularities
which may result in loss to the Council (e.g.
theft). Therefore, for the purpose of this
Strategy fraud has wider meaning to include
other irregularities. Pollick (2006) defines
fraud as collar criminals, business profes-
sionals with specialized knowledge and
criminal intent. Further, according to Black
Law Dictionary (cited in Lawrence et al
2004), fraud also means “taking advantage
over another person by providing false, mis-
leading suggestions, or by suppression of
the truth”. Therefore, fraud is not restricted
to monetary or material benefits. It includes
intangibles such as status and information.
In the Anti-fraud policy in Murdoch Uni-
versity (2001), fraud is described as “…in-
ducing a course of action by deceit or other
dishonest conduct, involving acts or omis-
sions or the making of false statements,
orally or in  writing, with the object of ob-
taining money  or other benefits from or by
evading a liability”.
Auditor Roles for Fraud Detection
The external auditor provides a cru-
cial role in providing reasonable assur-
ance to the quality of financial informa-
tion presented to stakeholders and other
users of financial statements. As an in-
dependent, objective party, shareholders,
creditors and other interested parties rely
on the audit report to determine whether
to rely on the information for decision
making. The two primary characteristics
that most stakeholders expect from the
external auditor are competence and in-
dependence. State licensure requirements
address the technical competency aspects
of the external auditor. The state of inde-
pendence is more difficult to determine.
The role of auditors has not been well
defined from inception (Alleyne &
Howard 2005). Porter (1997) reviews the
historical development of the auditors’
duty to detect and report fraud over the
centuries. Her study shows that there is
an evaluation of auditing practices and
shift in auditing paradigm through a num-
ber of stages. Boynton et al (2005) claim
that auditors are required to be more pro-
active in searching for fraud during the
course of an audit under ISA 240 (Re-
vised). Their duties now include consid-
ering incentives and opportunities pre-
sented to potential fraudsters, as well as
rationalizations that the fraudulent act are
justified. Auditors are also expected to
inquire more closely into reasons behind
such matters as, for example, errors in ac-
counting estimates, unusual transactions that
appear to lack business rationale, and a re-
luctance to correct immaterial errors discov-
ered by the audit.
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A relatively early study by Jensen and
Meckling (1976) examines some of the
issues associated with the distinction be-
tween managing and funding a business and
demonstrates how the separation of the two
gives. The study shows how a role for au-
ditors arises naturally from the existence of
outside ownership, or equity, claims against
a firm. As managers’ share of firm owner-
ship declines, they have the incentive to
boost their own total compensation, includ-
ing all types of fringe benefits, at the expense
of the other owners. Potential investors, rec-
ognizing the owner managers have this in-
centive, reduce the price they are willing to
pay for shares in the firm. But if the owner-
managers can commit to limiting their per-
quisites, investors will be willing to pay more
for shares, benefiting the owner-managers’
efforts to expand the firm. Subjecting the
firm’s financial records to an independent
audit can enhance the credibility of such a
commitment by the owner-managers.
Jensen and Meckling show that similar
considerations apply to a firm funded by
debt, or bonds. In this case, the owner-
managers borrow money to run the busi-
ness. Here, too, the managers’ incentives
differ from those of the individuals fund-
ing the firm. After managers have raised
funds from debt holders, they can ben-
efit by investing the money in high-risk
activities. Debt holders recognize the
managers’ and shareholders’ incentive to
pursue high-risk activities, potentially at their
expense, and therefore demand a higher rate
of interest, or a risk premium, on the money
lent to the firm. However, by committing in
a debt covenant to policies that limit debt
holders’ risk exposure, the managers and
shareholders may be able to reduce the pre-
mium. An independent auditor can help the
managers and shareholders demonstrate to
debt holders that such risk-limiting policies
are being followed.
Similar considerations apply to the role
of debt covenants and auditing in address-
ing the underinvestment problem Myers
(1977) analyzes, in which the shareholders
of a firm with outstanding debt can have the
incentive to reject investment projects with
a positive net value if the proceeds would
accrue to debt holders. Smith and Warner
(1979) describe various types of covenants
to protect bondholders from managers’ and
equity holders’ incentives to act against their
interests. Auditing can help verify the ac-
counting criteria in such covenants and help
ensure the agreements are honored.
If those investments pay off, the man-
agers can repay the debt holders the prom-
ised amount and keep the remainder for
themselves. If the investments perform
poorly, they can simply default on the debt.
In this case, shareholders are on the side of
the managers, since them, too, could ben-
efit from high-risk activities once the debt
has been issued. According to the above
researches, several factors may affect to
audit detection fraud and irregularities. In
this survey the authors are going to test the
affection of audit regulation to detection
fraud, lack of conflict interest and detection
fraud, audit market mechanism and detec-
tion fraud, and audit firm size and detection
fraud. Here we are going to explain the firm
size and audit quality which my cause to
detection fraud. Further, we ignore other
factors which in this research we assumed
that may affect to detection fraud.
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Firm Size
Size of audit firm has been used as a
surrogate for audit quality, that is large
audit firms have a reputation to safeguard
and therefore will ensure an independent
quality audit service. Larger audit firms
have better financial resources and re-
search facilities, superior technology and
more talented employees to undertake
large company audits than smaller audit
firms. Their larger client portfolios en-
able them to resist management pressure
whereas smaller firms provide more per-
sonalized services due to limited client
portfolios and are expected to succumb
to management requirements (Lys and
Watts, 1994). Therefore, size of audit
firm is an important characteristic that
reflects auditor independence. Thus, the
issue of maintaining auditor indepen-
dence is more crucial for smaller firms
than larger firms. A large body of research
examines the relationship between audit
firm size and audit quality.
Those studies can be traced back to
the seminal work by DeAngelo (1981)
Dye (1993). DeAngelo argues that large
audit firms are more independent and
hence higher quality because of both ad-
vanced techniques and more wealth at risk
upon audit failure. On the other hand, Dye
(1993) argues that investors are more likely
to sue a large audit firm than to a small audit
firm upon untruthful disclosure for their
“deep pocket”. Both theories forecast a
positive association between audit size and
quality.
Empirically, many researchers have
tested this association by different prox-
ies of audit quality. For example, St.
Pierre and Anderson (1984) and Palmrose
(1988) use the frequency of law suit against
audit firms as a measure of audit quality.
Those authors find that larger audit firms
have lower incidence of litigations and thus
higher quality. Reynolds & Francis (2001)
and Craswell et al. (2002) provide evidence
that larger audit firms tend to be stricter in
issuing opinions. In another research, Teoh
and Wong (1993) measure market percep-
tion of audit quality with earnings response
coefficients and find that investors show
more dramatic responses to reports au-
dited by Big 8 audit firms.  DeAngelo
(1981) suggests that users of financial
statements differentiate the credibility of
information content in the statements.
However, Krishnan (2005) found evi-
dence to the contrary and documented
that audit quality differed between and
within audit firms.
Empirical Evidences
Audit quality and auditor indepen-
dence are intricately related and the di-
rection of causality is not evident. For
Ramsay (2001: 96) ‘independence is an
imprecise and ambiguous concept and there
is much debate as to the appropriate level
of auditor independence and how this should
be applied’. Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) defines independence ‘as a
mental state of objectivity and lack of bias’
(Fankel et al, 2002: 72) while the Interna-
tional Federation of Accountants, IFAC,
(1999: 557) states that ‘professional ac-
countants in public practice when undertak-
ing a reporting assignment should be and
appear to be free of any interest which might
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be regarded, whatever its actual effect, as
being incompatible with integrity, objectiv-
ity and independence’. In its recently issued
two quality control standards (ISQC1 and
ISA 220R) IFAC strengthens its previous
audit quality control standards. The two new
standards deal with system of quality con-
trol, leadership responsibilities for quality,
ethnical requirements and independence, cli-
ent acceptance and relationship, human re-
source management within the audit firm, en-
gagement performance and monitoring. It
prescribes two key requirements: the rota-
tion of the engagement partner every seven
years and the appointment of an indepen-
dent pre-issuance audit quality control re-
view partner for the audit of ‘public interest
entities’. Testing evidences and finding sur-
rogates for empirical works have brought
more questions than answers (Kinney and
Libby, 2002; School of Accountancy,
2004). As it is very clear one of the main
components of audit quality is fraud detec-
tion. In such a condition the authors re-
quested to accomplish their job very nit, in
other words they requested to detect fraud
in financial statements.
Analytical procedures (APs) have been
posited to be a useful tool for identifying
fraud (Thornhill, 1995). APs is the name
used for a variety of techniques the auditor
can use to assess the risk of material mis-
statements in financial records. These pro-
cedures involve the analysis of trends, ra-
tios, and reasonableness tests derived from
an entity’s financial and operating data. SAS
No. 56 requires that APs be performed in
planning the audit with an objective of iden-
tifying the existence of unusual events,
amounts, ratios and trends that might indi-
cate matters that have financial statement
and audit planning implications (AICPA,
1988). According to SAS No. 99, the cur-
rent fraud standard, the auditor should con-
sider the results of APs in identifying the risks
of material misstatement due to fraud
(AICPA, 2002). While the procedures are
well known and widely used, there is a gen-
eral lack of understanding of how they are
properly applied, and how much reliance
should be placed on them. In the other side
of window, large number of prior studies
has shown that auditor reputation has di-
rect association with audit quality. Consis-
tent with the “deep pockets hypothesis”,
Dye (1993) posited that wealthier audit firms
have more motivation to be diligent in their
examinations of client companies, as their
greater wealth results in them being more
susceptible to lawsuits, and have more to
lose in the case of audit failure (Clarkson
and Simunic, 1994; Feltham et al., 1991).
On the other hand, smaller firms were said
to have less wealth; therefore, any favor-
able judgment in a lawsuit may possibly be
a hollow victory. Pearson (1980) found the
level of auditor independence to be posi-
tively associated with size of audit firm.
Large audit firms did not rely on revenue
from a single client because the impact
to their financial position was not mate-
rial, as compared to smaller audit firms.
Pearson (1980) reported that smaller firms
would experience more difficulty in resist-
ing client pressures in situations of conflict.
DeAngelo (1981) contended that large au-
dit firms had more to lose if they were found
to have failed to honestly report a client's
condition; therefore, their reports are ex-
pected to be more reliable. It was postu-
lated that large firms have larger client port-
folios than smaller firms; thus, they have
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more to lose if they are associated with ac-
counting scandals.  Smaller audit firms were
also claimed to provide a more personal-
ized mode of services that would enhance
close relationships with their clients (Gul,
1991; Shockley, 1982). Shockley (1981)
discovered that smaller audit firms are more
vulnerable to the risk of auditor indepen-
dence impairment than larger audit firms.
However, partners from local and/or re-
gional offices that responded to his ques-
tionnaire showed conflicting views. It is
believed that this group of respondents
is protective towards the smaller audit
firm’s image (Shockley, 1981). Pearson
and Ryans (1981/82) revealed that
smaller audit firms are more vulnerable
to company management pressures than
larger audit firms. However, partners in
small and medium sized audit firms dis-
agreed with the contention that the size
of the audit firm differentiates indepen-
dence. These results were supported when
Gul (1991) also found that larger audit firms
could more easily resist management pres-
sure than smaller audit firms, and smaller
audit firms were alleged to succumb to cli-
ent pressure.
Large audit firms have superior tech-
nology and more talented employees than
smaller firms, and consequently have higher
incentives to behave independently (McLennan
and Park, 2003). As a consequence, the in-
formation content of audit reports certified and
produced by large firms are considered to be
more credible and reliable than those of smaller
audit  firms (Davidson and Neu, 1993, Beatty,
1989; Titman and Trueman, 1986).
Recent audit quality research has fo-
cused on the role of auditor industry spe-
cialization. Hogan and Jeter (1999) find
that measures of specialization have in-
creased in both regulated and unregulated
industries, consistent with returns to spe-
cialization.
Craswell et al. (1995) argue that au-
dit firms market themselves in terms of
both a general reputation and industry ex-
pertise. In a test of audit fees in the Aus-
tralian audit market, they find that indus-
try specialists receive a significant fee
premium, and that this fee premium is a
significant component of the fee pre-
mium received by Big 5 firms.
Objectives and Research Questions
As mentioned before, the audit qual-
ity is the effect of audit practice. One of
the major elements of audit quality is
fraud detection. Since our objective is to
determine the factors which may have posi-
tive or negative to audit quality or audit fraud
detection. In order to reach this objective,
the questions below are considered:
Q1: Do audit regulations affect fraud
detection?
Q2: Do the lack of conflict interest
caused higher fraud detection?
Q3: Do market mechanism positively
affect fraud detection in Iranian corpo-
rate sector?
Q4: Do audit firm size affect better
fraud detection?
According to above objectives and re-
search question the suitable research meth-
odology were employed.
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willingness to explore and report important
distortions neutrally.
H2: The lack of Contras benefit af-
fects IPCA members’ willingness to ex-
plore and report important distortions
neutrally.
H3: Market mechanism affects IPCA
members’ willingness to explore and re-
port important distortions neutrally.
H4: The size of auditing firms affects
IPCA members’ willingness to explore
and report important distortions neutrally.
Out of 240 questionnaires 180 respon-
dents completed the research. Among
these 180 participants, there were 29 ex-
pert in accounting and auditing (16.10 per
cent) worked as independent auditors, 30
participants (16.80 per cent) worked as
internal auditors, 60 were financial and
banking managements (62.40 per cent
participants), 30 were faculty members and
31 were accounting students.
They consist of 55 male (30.60 per-
cent) and 125 female (29.40 percent).
Further, 135 participants were younger
than 40 (75 per cent) and 45 participants
elder than 40 (25 per cent). Among these
52.50 per cent had less than one year ex-
perience, 36 percent had between 10 to
20 years experience and 21.5 per cent had
more than 20 years experience.
The majority of participants had suffi-
cient auditing knowledge. Out of 180 par-
ticipants 113 participants hold bachelor de-
gree in accounting and finance fields (62.50
per cent), and 67 participants hold M.A or
Ph.D. degrees in accounting or finance fields
(47.5 percent). Demographic characteris-
tics of participants are summarized in Table
1.
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In this research at firs step, the im-
portant factors that are related to audit-
ing quality were explored by studying 
technical contexts. Further, for collect-
ing useable data according to suitable lit-
erature, questionnaires were designed 
and developed. The questionnaire con-
tained two parts, namely; Bio data and 
main questions. In this research, partici-
pants at the first step are requested to de-
termine their idea (agreement or dis-
agreement to the effects of independent 
variable on detecting important distor-
tions) then, according to their idea, are 
requested to determine degree of agree-
ment and disagreement for assessing de-
gree of disagreement and agreement we 
used the range of integer number from-
9 to 9 which -9 represent highly disagree-
ment and 9 represent highly agreement 
to the hypothesis while zero represent none 
of them. In this research reliability and va-
lidity of questionnaire are determined by 
calculate of kronbakh coefficient.
  Then the validity of explored title is as-
sessed by Delphi group that includes Asso-
ciation of Iran certified public Accounting 
(IPCA) member.  In the Delphi session:
Using gained viewpoints, the elemen-
tary group are requested to determine the 
relation and importance of detected index 
regulated. Hence we can say, those factors 
that conduct research hypotheses are those 
factors that are completely compatible to 
Iran environment. To the bases of impor-
tant factor we conducted three hypotheses 
including:
H1: the rule and regulation oversees ac-
tivity of IPCA members’ effects on their
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Table (1) frequency table of participants
Case Label Frequency Percent
Gender Male   55  30.60
Female 125   69.40
Age Less than 30  28  35.60
30  to 45  98  54.60
More than 45  18     9.80
Work Less than 10  75  42.50
experience 10 to 20  64 360
More than 20  38  21.50
Education Bachelor degree 113  62.80
Master   58  32.20
PhD     3     1.70
Position Independent Auditor   29  16.10
Internal Auditor   30  16.80
Financial and Banking Management  60  33.60
Faculty member   30  16.80
Student   31  17.50
The binomial test was first conducted
to assess which per cent of participants ac-
cept the effects of independent factors on
dependent ones. For this purpose we di-
vided participant into two groups including
agreeing and disagreeing with hypotheses.
The result revealed that rule and regulations
that oversees on the auditor practices have
significant effects on auditor willingness to
reporting important distortions neutrally
(p<0.05). 119 participant (66 per cent)
agreed with this hypothesis which accord-
ing to our results this hypothesis is confirmed
(H1) with the mean degree of agreement
equal to 1.8 (S.D. = 2.1, 95 per cent of
confidence interval from 1.2 to 2.4). The
second hypothesis in this group was the sur-
vey on the lack of contrast benefit effects
on auditor willingness to report important
distortions neutrally. The results shows that
this hypothesis is rejected (H2) while 105
participants did not agree to this hypothesis
(61 per cent), the mean degree of disagree-
ment was -0.49 (S.D. = 1.91, 95 per cent
of confidence interval from -1.6 to 0.084).
According to our results third hypothesis in
this research was significantly confirmed
(p<0.05). Further, there were 159 partici-
pants (88 per cent) strongly agreed that the
effects of market mechanism on auditor will-
ingness to report important distortions neu-
trally (H3). The size of audit firms was the
final hypothesis that didn’t confirmed ac-
cording these results. There were126 par-
ticipants (70 per cent) disagreed that the
effect of audit firms size on auditor willing-
ness to report important distortions (H4).
The summary results of testing hypoth-
eses by binomial test shows in Table 2.
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Hypothesis Category    Fre-   Ob- Test Asymp.       Result
quency served prop. sig.
H1 (Rule and Regula-
tion oversees) Disagreeing   61 0.34  0.5  0.000 Confirmed
Agreeing 119 0.66
H2 (Contrast interest) Disagreeing 109 0.61  0.5  0.34 Rejected
Agreeing   71 0.39
H3 (Market Mechanism) Disagreeing   21 0.12  0.5  0.000 Confirmed
Agreeing 159 0.88
H4 (size of Audit firm) Disagreeing 126   0.7  0.5  0.58 Rejected
Agreeing   54   0.3
Table (3) Mean degree participants agreement or disagreement
and other statistical tools.
Independent variable Mean Standard 95 per cent of confidence
degree deviation interval
Rule and Regulation
oversees Auditor activity  1.81  2.1  1.2 to  2.41
Contrast interest -0.49  1.9 -1.06 to 0.84
Market  Mechanism  4.41 2.92  3.98 to 4.84
Size of Auditing Institution -2.32 1.38 -3.12 to -1.53
Note: Positive numbers represent mean degree of agreement while negative num-
bers represent mean degree of disagreement.
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Table (2) dependent variable effect on detecting and reporting distortions neutrally 
and test results by binomial test
As said before the participants re-
quested to determine degree of agreement 
or disagreement to the questions. Table 3 
represents the mean degree of agreement 
or disagreement according to their idea and 
other statistical tools.
As shown in upon table the Market 
mechanism has the most effect on detecting 
important distortion neutrally by auditor.
CONCLUSION
Accounting scandals such as Enron, 
WorldCom, Adelphia, and Global Cross-
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ing have stakeholders asking “why the ex-
ternal auditors failed to detect financial
statement fraud (Lee, 2003)”. Further, the
auditors should be alert at a time when fi-
nancial crimes are on the increase, regard-
ing their profession. However, a consider-
able amount of academic and policy litera-
ture exists about audit fraud duties
(Wolnizer, 1995). One cardinal issue is that
unless the auditor is a party to a major col-
lusion act, a firm does not normally fail be-
cause of its auditor. The dominant reasons
for corporate failure are bad operational and
strategic decisions, unanticipated exogenous
shocks and the dysfunctional behavior of the
firm’s executives and employees. The audit 
process thus is at best diagnostic (Ng, Green 
and Simnett, 2001: 352, 355) and the au-
ditor may only be responsible for not prop-
erly diagnosing the firm’s financial position 
and performance. Further, it is important to 
note that the true financial health of the firm 
may not be observable, even under a real 
time financial reporting and accounting sys-
tem, by the insiders of the firm. Hence, in 
trying to identify the correct financial posi-
tion of the, Iranian firms may lead to limiting 
fraud commitments. To provide this ideal en-
vironment accordingly, the results of this 
survey from the view point of the partici-
pants audit roles and regulations, and mar-
ket mechanism may help Iranian corporate 
sector to this audit final goal, it is highly sug-
gested Iranian audit legislators improve au-
dit roles and regulation.
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